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I. INTRODUCTION
The increasing frequency of global influenza pandemics, together
with the SARS outbreak of 2003, have highlighted the need to improve
* This is a modified and fully edited version of Working Paper No. 1, International
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Disaster Law Working Paper Series,
http://www.ifrc.org/what/disasters/idrl/research/workingpapers.asp. The authors would like to
acknowledge financial assistance from the Instituto Tecnol6gico Aut6nomo de Mdxico and the
Asociaci6n Mexicana de Cultura A.C. for their generous support of this research. We thank
Marcello Basili, Holger Hestermeyer, Atul Jain, Stephen Kay and Sajal Lahiri for their helpful
comments on earlier drafts of this paper. We are solely responsible for the views expressed here.
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international coordination, share information and minimize the
economic impact when such outbreaks occur.' These concerns
motivated the World Health Organization (WHO) to issue guidelines on
communicating with the public during pandemics in 2004 and the
member states of the World Health Assembly to adopt substantial
revisions to the International Health Regulations (IHR (2005)) in 2005.2
In theory, these instruments have balanced states' fears concerning the
potential economic impacts of a transparent pandemic response with the
public health needs for speedy action and sharing of information. The
experience of the 2009 outbreak of the HIN1 pandemic (HINI (09)) particularly in Mexico - has demonstrated some of the enduring
problems with this balancing act, not all of which are the type that
might have been supposed.
Article 2 of the IHR (2005) establishes the purpose and scope of the
Regulations in the following terms: "to prevent, protect against, control
and provide a public health response to the international spread of
disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public
health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with
international traffic and trade."3 The objective of avoiding unnecessary
interference with international traffic and trade reflects the concerns of
countries regarding the negative economic impact of disproportionate
responses to public health risks that lack scientific justification. There
have been many such cases. Following an outbreak of cholera in Peru in
1991, even though the WHO and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control
found that there was no basis for travel or trade restrictions, the
European Community and other countries imposed import bans on fish
and other perishable foods, inspection requirements and restrictions on
travelers from Peru.4 In 1994, after India reported a suspected outbreak
of plague, even though the WHO had advised that no travel or trade
restrictions were appropriate, other countries canceled flights, closed
borders to goods and people, and issued travel advisories.5 Such
responses explain the past reluctance of countries to report public health
threats.
1. See Bradly J. Condon & Tapen Sinha, Chronicle of a Pandemic Foretold: Lessons

from the 2009 Influenza Epidemic (May 3, 2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract1398445.
2. WHO Communicable Disease Surveillance and Response, OutbreakCommunication:
Best Practicesfor Communicating with the Public During an Outbreak WHO/CDS/2005.32
(Sept. 21-23 2004).
3. World Health Organization [WHO], International Health Regulations, art. 2, WHA
58.3, Fifty-Eighth World Health Assembly (2005), available at http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/
pdffiles/WHA58 3-en.pdf) [hereinafter IHR].
4. Barbara von Tigerstrom, The Revised InternationalHealth Regulations and Restraint
ofNationalHealth Measures, 13 HEALTH L.J 35, 42-43 (2005).
5. Id.
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In this sense, the IHR (2005) reinforce provisions in the "law of the
World Trade Organization (WTO)" (WTO Law) discouraging excessive
and unwarranted restraints to trade based on public health concerns. The
mutually reinforcing features of the IHR (2005) and WTO law have
been well analyzed. 6 Together, IHR (2005) and WTO law should
provide obligations, incentives and guarantees sufficient to prompt
states to quickly report outbreaks of infectious disease. However, these
incentives depend on rapid and effective WHO recommendations that,
together with WTO law, would minimize the risk of economic harm
caused by disproportionate trade restrictions. The 2009 influenza
outbreak demonstrated that even if WHO recommendations are issued
relatively rapidly, they are unlikely to be effective in preventing the use
of disproportionate trade and travel restrictions. Moreover, WTO law is
unlikely to prevent states from taking measures whose appropriateness
would only become clear with hindsight.
Member States had until June 2009 to assess their ability to comply
with the core surveillance requirements of the IHR (2005) and to
implement a plan for ensuring compliance. Reducing the risk of
disproportionate trade restrictions would enhance economic incentives
to comply with surveillance requirements. While the HR (2005)
contain norms that discourage the use of disproportionate trade
restrictions in response to disease outbreaks, health-related trade
restrictions are regulated by the WTO. How to ensure that the incentives
created by the international legal system function effectively in
regulating responses to outbreaks of infectious diseases remains an open
question.
This Article is organized as follows. We first consider the problems
that the IHR (2005) were meant to resolve, such as the need for rapid
reporting of outbreaks, the related need to minimize disproportionate
travel and trade restrictions in response to outbreaks and the need for
international leadership to coordinate the global response. We then
analyze how the IlHR (2005) are designed to achieve this end and how
effective a tool the IHR (2005) proved to be during the 2009 influenza
outbreak. We also consider the WHO guidelines for communicating
with the public during a pandemic and assess the effectiveness of the
6. See, e.g., John D. Blum, Law as Development: Reshaping the Global Legal
Structures of Public Health, 12 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 207 (2004); David Byme, Is There a
Lawyer in the House: The Law of Global Public Health, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICs 19 (2005);
Emily Lee, The World Health Organization's Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity, and
Health: Turning Strategy Into Action, 60 FOOD DRUG L.J. 569 (2005); Timothy J. Miano,
Understandingand Applying InternationalInfectious DiseaseLaw: UN Regulations Duringan
H5N1 Avian Flu Epidemic, 6 CHI.-KENT J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 26 (2006); Jason Sapsin,
InternationalTrade Agreements: Vehicle for Better Public Health?, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 111
(2005).
7. IHR, supra note 3, art. 5.
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Mexican government's pandemic planning and communication strategy
in addressing the HINi (09) epidemic. We then consider the role of
WTO law in regulating the use of disproportionate trade restrictions in
response to disease outbreaks.

II. INTERNATIONAL

HEALTH REGULATIONS AND
DISEASE SURVEILLANCE

An important objective of the WHO's regulatory powers is to
harmonize national behavior through international standards based on
scientific and public health principles.8 The 1969 International Health
Regulations (IHR (1969)), which focused on relatively passive
notification and control measures for cholera, plague, yellow fever and
smallpox, were ineffective with respect to more recent global public
health crises, including HIV/AIDS, SARS and the threat of an influenza
pandemic. The IHR (1969) also limited the WHO's ability to respond to
new outbreaks of disease by requiring the WHO to rely on official state
notifications, rather than other sources. WHO member states often did
not comply with the IHR (1969), failing to notify the WHO of cases of
diseases and applying excessive health measures beyond those
permitted by the IHR (1969).9 The risk of economic losses due to
disproportionate trade and travel restrictions created a disincentive to
report outbreaks of infectious diseases.
The IHR (2005) introduced a new surveillance system for all
diseases and health events that ma constitute a "public health
emergency of international concern., o The IHR (2005) expanded
disease coverage, notification requirements, and the sources of
information that the WHO can use regarding disease outbreaks. The
IHR (2005) also set standards for public health responses to the
international spread of disease, but leave States with considerable
discretion regarding their implementation at the national level."
The central obligation of countries is to report outbreaks of disease,
broadly defined, to the WHO. Article 6 of the IHR (2005) requires
States to notify the WHO of all events, which may constitute a public
health emergency of international concern within its territory, and any
health measure that has been implemented in response to those events.
In making its recommendations, Article 9 allows the WHO to take into
8.

David D Fidler, The Future of the World Health Organization: What Role for

InternationalLaw?, 31 VAND J. TRANSNAT'L LAW 1079 (1998).

9. Von Tigerstrom, supra note 4, at 36.
10. IHR, supra note 3, art. 6.
11. Id. art. 13.
12. Id. art. 6.
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account reports from sources other than notifications or consultations
from the affected State.' 3
In addition to these obligations, the rise of modem communication
technologies has given countries an incentive to report disease
outbreaks to the WHO, in order to ensure the accuracy of WHO's
report. These technologies (mobile telephones, email and internet) make
it difficult for countries to suppress information regarding outbreaks of
contagious diseases. Once the existence of an outbreak becomes known,
the level of the public health risk and the effectiveness of the affected
country's response influence the responses of other countries (trade and
travel restrictions) and the economic consequences of those responses.
However, the HIN1 (09) outbreak demonstrates that the suppression
of information is not the only issue that influences how rapidly disease
outbreaks are reported. The outbreak must also be detected quickly.
Mexico reported the disease outbreak quickly, once it became aware
that it was not dealing with ordinary seasonal influenza.14 However, it
later became aparent that the HIN1 (09) pandemic probably had begun
much earlier.' At the time, health officials mistook it for seasonal
influenza, since it coincided with the normal influenza season and was
relatively mild.16
The IHR (2005) establishes an Emergency Committee to give the
Director General its views on the existence and termination of a public
health emergency of international concern and on any proposed
temporary recommendations. Once the Director General determines that
a public health emergency of international concern exists, the Director
General can issue temporary recommendations regarding measures to
be taken by the affected State or other States to prevent or reduce the
international spread of disease and avoid unnecessary interference with
international traffic.' 7 Article 17 requires that health measures
recommended by the Director General be determined on the basis of a
risk assessment appropriate to the circumstances, not be more restrictive
of international traffic and trade and not more intrusive to persons than
reasonably available alternatives that would achieve the "appropriate"
level of health protection.' 8
13. Id. art. 9.
14. Bradly J. Condon & Tapen Sinha, Diario de la peste, 31:378 Nexos 29, 30
(June 2009).
15. Id.
16. Condon & Sinha, supra note 1, app. A.
17. IHR, supra note 3, art. 48.
18. The language of Article 17 echoes some of the legal criteria applied in WITO law to
trade-restrictive health measures in order to determine whether they can be justified under the
general exceptions of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article XX (b) or
permitted under the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures or the Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade. However, under GATT countries remain free to select their level of
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Before the pandemic HIN1 (09) virus outbreak, some commentators
believed that even if the WHO Director General were to declare a public
health emergency of international concern and issue recommendations,
affected countries would be unwilling to accept those recommendations
and would seek to negotiate a compromise, as happened in Canada's
case with SARS.19 However, these predictions failed to come true when
Mexico faced the HINI (09) outbreak, underlining the unpredictable
nature of epidemics and governmental responses.
III. MEXICO'S PANDEMIC PREPARATIONS
Mexico was prepared for an influenza pandemic well in advance. 20
Studies of earlier pandemics convinced the Mexican government that
the benefits of pandemic planning exceeded the costs. It implemented
its ?lan almost to the letter when the new virus was confirmed on April
23.
Mexico is the only developing country member of the Global Health
Security Action Group, a public health communications network whose
other members are Canada, Japan, the United States, and several
22
European countries.22
Criticism regarding the Mexican government's
response ignores the complexity of recognizing and responding to an
unexpected public health emergency. 2 3 The Mexican government knew
that a flu pandemic could infect 25-35% of population. A model based
on past pandemics predicted the following probable impact of a worsthealth protection and can select a zero tolerance approach. This wording seems to suggest that at
the WHO level the recommendations of the Director General depart from a mere "appropriate"
level of protection (whatever that may be). IHR, supra note 3, art. 17.
19. Jonathan F. Suk, Sound Science and the New International Health Regulations, 1
GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE (Fall 2007), available at http://www.ghgj.org/suk.htm.
20. Mexico passed legislation in July 2006 that mandated the creation of a National Plan
for Preparation and Response to an Influenza Pandemic (Plan Nacional de Preparaci6n y
Respuesta ante una Pandemia de Influenza) and a National Committee on Health Security
(Comit6 Nacional para la Seguridad en Salud) and made the plan mandatory for all levels of the
national healthcare system. See Acuerdo del Consejo de Salubridad General por el que se
Establecen las Actividades de Preparaci6n y Respuesta ante una Pandemia de Influenza, DOF,
19 July 2006. The National Plan was published in August 2006. See Plan Nacional de
Preparaci6n y Respuesta ante una Pandemia de Influenza, availableat http://www.fao.org/docs/
eims/upload/221482/national_plan aimexes.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2010) [hereinafter
National Plan]. The plan sets out general guidelines for the preparation for and response to an
influenza pandemic in order to mitigate the impact of an influenza pandemic in Mexico. The
Mexican government also prepared a Guide for the Preparation of Institutions for an Influenza
Pandemic (Gufa para la Preparaci6n de Instituciones ante una Pandemia de Influenza).
21. Condon & Sinha, supra note 14, at 31.
22. Global Health Security Initiative, available at http://www.ghsi.ca/english/
background.asp.
23. Julio Frenk, Mexico's FastDiagnosis,N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 30 2009.
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case-scenario pandemic in Mexico, assuming a duration of eight weeks
peaking in the fifth week, 25% of population infected and 17% with a
high risk of complications: 21,522-117,461 deaths; 80,727-352,513
hospitalizations; 11,798,789-20,710,591 medical consultations; 278%
use of hospital capacity in the first week and 912% in the fifth week;
58% use of ventilator capacity in the first week and 269% in the fifth;
9,084.7 million MXN (672.9 million USD at 13.5) in direct costs and
148,853.8 million MXN (11,026.2 million USD) in indirect costs (1.6%
of annual GDP). 24 The Mexican government took this public health risk
very seriously.
Mexico's pandemic preparation plan envisaged three types of
measures. First, medical interventions would focus on antiviral
medication, vaccines, medical attention and personal protection
equipment (e.g., gloves and masks).25 In this category, Mexico
stockpiled antiviral medications in advance, provided medical attention
regardless of the healthcare coverage of the individual and distributed
surgical masks when the outbreak occurred. 26 However, Mexico's
stockpile antiviral medications in the first week of the outbreak was
only 1.4 million courses of treatment, enough for only 1.3% of the
population. 27 Vaccination was not an option initially, except for
seasonal flu, since it would take several months to manufacture a
vaccine for the HIN1 (09) virus.28 Moreover, when the epidemic struck,
Mexico was still in the process of expanding its vaccine manufacturing
capacity, which was scheduled for completion in 2011.29
Second, non-medical interventions would focus on personal hygiene
(e.g., hand-washing), travel restrictions, quarantine, social distancing
(e.g., school closures) and communication of risks. 30 In this regard, the
Mexican government advised people on personal hygiene measures in
24. Pablo Kuri, Mexican Ministry of Health, "Preparaci6n para la respuesta ante una
Pandemia de Influenza," Presentation to ITAM Faculty Meeting, Nov. 29, 2007.
25. Id.
26. Condon & Sinha, supra note 1, app. A.
27. Id.
28. Keiji Fukuda of the WHO, on July 8, 2009, declared that the new virus would
henceforth be called by this name. See World Health Organization, Transcript of Virtual Press
Conference with Dr. Keiji Fukuda, Assistant Director-General ad Interim for Health Security
and Environment, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/Pandemic-hl n1presstranscript 2009 07
07.pdf. However, this name has not been universally accepted. As of August 2009, the CDC
continued to call it the "Novel HINI virus."
29. Thelma Gomez, "OMS pidip laboratorios a Mexico desde 1999," El Universal, Apr.
30, 2009, available at http://el-universal.com.mx. In 2008, the Mexican government announced
the acquisition of a manufacturing plant that would have the capacity to manufacture 20 million
vaccine doses annually and signed an agreement with Sanofi Aventis to produce vaccines in
Mexico in conjunction with state-owned Laboratorios de Biol6gicos y Reactivos de Mdxico, SA
de CV (Birmex).
30. Kuri, supra note 24.
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public announcements (including in President Calderon's press
conferences), progressively implemented social distancing (moving
from school closures to cancellation of public events to shutting down
all non-essential services and advising people to avoid crowded,
enclosed places) and followed the WHO guidelines for communicating
with the public during an outbreak. 3 1 The government did not impose
travel restrictions or quarantine, due to the determination of both the
United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and
WHO that containment was not feasible and that efforts should focus on
mitigation.3 2
Third, the maintenance of social and economic systems would
prioritize security and legislation, water and food supplies, energy
supplies, transportation, telecommunications and financial services.
When the government shut down non-essential services from May 1-5
these areas were not only left operating, but had their hours expanded. 34
These measures aimed to delay the peak in the epidemic, thereby
reducing the number of cases and the burden on healthcare services that
would otherwise occur (see Figure 1, below).3 5

31. Condon & Sinha, supra note 1, app. A
32. Id.
33. Kuri, supra note 24.
34. Condon & Sinha, supra note 1, app. A.
35. Interim Pre-pandemic Planning Guidance: Conununity Strategy for Pandemic
Influenza Mitigation, CDC (Feb 2007), available at http://flu.gov/professional/community/
index.html.
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Figure 1: The objective of an intervention is to postpone the onset and
reduce the peak of a pandemic
Objective of Intervention
I Delay outbreak peak
2 Reduce peak burden on hospitals and infrastructure
3 Reduce the number of cases and severity of outbreak

1

Cases
Per Day

Days after the first case

(Source: bttp://www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/community/commitigation.html)

Many members of the public, both in Mexico and abroad, were
puzzled and alarmed by the dramatic measures implemented by Mexico
in response to the epidemic.36 Experts in pandemic response were not.
Indeed, the Director General of the WHO repeatedly praised the
Mexican government for its response to the epidemic.3 1 This dramatic
response had been planned for several years. 38 Mexico's pandemic
preparations and its response to HINI were based on innovative
intelligence and close cooperation with the world's most advanced
economies, particularly Canada and the United States. 3 9
Nevertheless, there were gaps in Mexico's pandemic preparation.
Insufficient supplies of masks, gloves and gowns meant that Mexico

36.
3 7.
38.
39.

Condon & Sinha, supra note 1, app. A.
Id.
See National Plan, supra note 20.
Kuri, supra note 24.
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required donations from other countries, such as China and Japan.4 0
Insufficient testing equipment forced Mexico to report suspected cases
when the United States was reporting confirmed cases, which gave the
initial impression that the situation was far worse in Mexico than it
was.41 Mexico's stockpile of antiviral medicine, while sufficient for this
outbreak, was far below what its needs could have been in a more
serious situation.42 This may have been a factor in Mexico's decision to
respond as aggressively as it did with mitigation measures. Had the
government not delayed the peak as effectively as it did, Mexico could
have had far more cases.4 3 In that event, its supply of antiviral medicine
probably would have been inadequate and further supplies could have
been difficult to acquire. In addition, Mexico's capacity to manufacture
vaccine is insufficient.44 While the expansion of this capacity was part
of Mexico's pandemic preparation, 4 5 it appears that it will arrive too late
for this epidemic.
There was a lack of coordination between different levels of
government, most notably the Mexico City and federal governments,
both of which gave daily news conferences regarding the latest
influenza statistics in their respective jurisdictions.4 Different political
parties occupy the Mexico City government (PRD) and presidency
(PAN) and this appeared to generate competition over public
perceptions regarding who was doing the best job of addressing the
crisis.4 7 This lack of coordination was possibly linked to the upcoming
elections for Congress in July 2009 and for president in 2012.48 Party
politics need to be set aside in an emergency and the government needs
to speak with one voice. Pandemic planning should set these rules in
advance. Finally, like the rest of the world, Mexico assumed that the
epidemic would start in Asia.49 This assumption turned out to be wrong.
Pandemic planning should assume that a pandemic could start
anywhere.

IV. THE HiN1

(09) OUTBREAK TESTS PANDEMIC PREPARATIONS

The HINI (09) outbreak provided the first test for the IHR and the
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Condon & Sinha, supra note 1, app. A.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Kuri, supra note 24.
Condon & Sinha, supranotel4.
Condon & Sinha, supra note 1, app. A.
Id.
Id.
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WHO. The WHO's response was better than some experts had
predicted. Mexico's response was also better than many expected a
developing country's response would be. However, the outbreak also
revealed cracks in the new international framework for information
sharing. We offer seven key observations.
First, Mexico complied with its obligation to report its outbreaks to
the WHO.5 0 This suggests an understanding of its obligations and the
incentives to report outbreaks.
Second, Mexico's delays in reporting what later turned out to be
cases of the HINI (09) virus appear to be due to insufficient technical
expertise or equipment combined with the timing of the outbreak, rather
than a desire to hide the outbreak.5 1 Figure 2 shows when the HINI
(09) outbreak occurred in relation to the regular flu season in Mexico.
The weekly trend did have an unusual peak in late April. However, this
peak was nowhere near the peak that occurred in January 2009. Even
with the peak, the level was lower than what took place in November
2008. Thus, there is no evidence that the Mexican Government delayed
any reporting. On the contrary, it reported based on suspected cases
even before they were confirmed. 52
Figure 2: An Unusual Uptick of Influenza Late in the Season
Flu Trend in Mexico June 1, 2008 - August 23, 2009
2.5
January 18, 200
2-

1.5

1

0.5

J-08

50.
51.
52.

J-08

S-08

0-08

D-08

F-09

M-09

M-09

J-09

A-09

Condon & Sinha, supra note 14, at 30.
Condon & Sinha, supra note 1, app. A.
Id.
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This might suggest that the obligation to report outbreaks may prove
ineffective in the absence of adequate technical expertise and
equipment. However, the United States also experienced delays, even
though its earliest cases appear to have occurred around the same time
as Mexico's earliest cases. 5 Thus, it is possible that some outbreaks
may be difficult to detect or their seriousness may be difficult to
confirm as quickly as we would like, regardless of the level of technical
expertise and equipment. It may be that the timing of the outbreak and
the nature of the virus were the primary cause of any delays.
Third, the WHO DG did declare a public health emergency of
international concern, within forty-eight hours of laboratory
confirmation that the Mexican virus was new and that it was the same as
the U.S. virus. 5 4 While some might like to see a faster response, this
contradicts prior speculation that the WHO DG would be unwilling to
make such a declaration.
Fourth, two days after the declaration, the WHO raised the alert
level to four and issued recommendations, before raising it to level five
two days later. Again, while some might like to see a faster response,
this contradicts prior speculation that the WHO DG would be unwilling
to issue recommendations. After the declaration of alert level five, there
was speculation as to whether the WHO would raise the alert to the
highest possible level of six. That declaration came much later - on
June 11, 2009.56
Fifth, a significant number of countries - from different parts of the
world and with varying levels of economic development - chose to
ignore the WHO DG's recommendations in introducing trade and travel
restrictions. In contrast to the reporting obligation, the WHO DG's
recommendations are not binding.5 8 This suggests that non-binding
recommendations might not prove effective in minimizing the economic
damage caused by disproportionate trade and travel restrictions. These
trade and travel restrictions were more severe for Mexico than for other
affected countries. 59 Despite the earliest confirmed cases surfacing in
the United States and Mexico around the same time and the large
number of cases in the United States, many assumed that Mexico was

53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Press Statement of WHO Director-General Dr Margaret Chan, June 11, 2009,
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2009/hlnl_pandemic_phase6_2009061 1/en/i
ndex.html.
57. See infra Table 1.
58. IHR, supra note 3.
59. See infra Table 1.
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the origin of the virus without any scientific evidence to confirm this
conclusion. 60
In Figure 3a (below), we display the number of confirmed cases in
the three countries in North America: Canada, Mexico and the United
States. While Mexico started with a larger number of confirmed cases,
the U.S. figures exceeded that of the Mexican cases on May 7, 2009,
two weeks after the pandemic broke out. The discriminatory treatment
of Mexico is apparent. If one compares the confirmed cases per million
people in Canada and Mexico, Mexico leads (see Figure 3b). However,
the difference between the United States and Canada disappears
altogether.
Figure 3a: Total Confirmed Cases in North America (April 23, 2009
- May 14,2009)
Total Number of Confirmed Cases
5000
4500
4000
3500
3000

+ Mexico

-

2500

USA

-+- Canada

2000
1500
1000
500
0
23-Apr

26-Apr

29-Apr

2-May

5-May

8-May

11-May

14-May

(Sources: CIA Factbook (populations, est July 2009), WHO, Public Health Canada, CDC, Secretaria
de Salud (Mexico))

60.

Condon & Sinha, supra note 1, app. A.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010

13

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 1

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

14

[Vol. 22

Figure 3b: Confirmed Cases per Million Persons in North
America (April 23, 2009 - May 14, 2009)
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(Sources: CIA Factbook (populations, est. July 2009), WHO, Public Health Canada, CDC, Secretaria
de Salud (Mexico))

The perception that Mexico was the source of the problem appears
to be due to three factors. First, Mexico initially reported suspected
cases (a much larger number than confirmed cases) while the United
States only reported confirmed cases.61 Second, Mexico applied serious
mitigation measures earlier and more broadly than other countries. 62
This not only helped Mexico avoid a greater number of cases in
Mexico; it also represents a serious commitment to addressing a global
health threat that benefited other countries as well. 63 Third, most of the
early confirmed cases outside of Mexico were linked to travel to
Mexico." The earliest confirmed cases in the United States are an
important exception to this pattern. 65 Thus, trade and travel measures
that discriminated against Mexico were based more on the perception of
risk than scientific proof of risk. One need only compare the number of
confirmed cases in Mexico at the time that many of these restrictions
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id..
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were implemented against Mexico with the number of confirmed cases
elsewhere when restrictions were applied (or not) against other
countries (see Table 1, below).

Table 1: Confirmed (Suspected) Cases Versus Travel and
Trade Restrictions
Date

Confirmed

Travel Measures

(suspected)

April 23
April 24

Mexico 18
Mexico
18(1004);
US 7(NA)

April 25

Mexico
18(1400);
US 20(NA)

April 26

Mexico
26(1614);
US 40(NA);
Canada 6(NA)

Trade
Measures

--

Brazil, Chile, Peru, Colombia,
Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, El
Salvador and Panama begin
sanitary controls on arrivals from

--

Mexico.

Japan starts screening arrivals from
Mexico for fever. Argentina, Costa
Rica, Dominican Republic and
Honduras begin sanitary controls
on arrivals from Mexico.
US begins "passive surveillance"
on arrivals from Mexico. China,
Russia set up quarantines. Hong
Kong advises residents not to
travel to Mexico. Malaysia, South
Korea and Japan check airport

Nicaragua
restricts pork
imports from
Mexico.
--

passengers for signs of illness.

April 27

Mexico
26(1995);
US 64(NA);
Canada 6(NA)

CDC recommends Americans
forgo "nonessential travel" to
Mexico. EU health minister urges
Europeans to avoid nonessential
travel to the US or Mexico, but
later denies she issued any travel
advisory,

April 28

Mexico
26(2498);
US 91(NA);
Canada 13(NA)

Britain, Canada, France, Germany,
Switzerland advise against
nonessential travel to Mexico.
Australia recommends citizens
who travel to Canada consult a
doctor if symptoms develop. India
and Malaysia warn citizens to
restrict travel to Mexico, Canada

China, Russia
ban pork imports
from Mexico
and affected US
states. Indonesia,
Lebanon ban
pork imports
from Canada,
Mexico
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and the US. Japan requires
Mexicans to obtain visas before
arrival; sets up quarantine for
suspected cases. Britain tells
citizens in Mexico to consider
leaving. Cuba and Argentina
suspend flights to Mexico for 48
hours. Air Canada, Westjet and
Transat suspend flights to Mexican
beach resorts.

April 29

Mexico
97(NA);
US 109(NA);
Canada 19(NA)

April 30

Mexico
156(NA);
US 109(NA);
Canada 34(NA)

May 1

Mexico
397(NA);
US 141(NA);
Canada 51 (NA)

Ecuador, Peru suspends flights
with Mexico. French health
minister calls for suspension of
flights from EU to Mexico. Five
cruise lines stop all port calls in

China ban
imports of pigs
and pork from
Mexico and 3
US states.

Mexico.

EU rejects French proposal to
suspend flights with Mexico.
Taiwan issues a red alert for
citizens not to travel to Mexico,

--

yellow alert for Canada and US.

Hong Kong quarantines hotel.
China suspends flights from
Mexico to Shanghai. Nestl6 bans
all non-essential travel by its

--

executives to US and Mexico.

May 2

Mexico
506(NA);
US I 60(NA);
Canada 70(NA);
EU 39

Chinese health authorities find and
place under quarantine 164 of the
189 passengers and crew members
aboard a flight from Mexico to
Shanghai.

Ukraine,
Philippines and
Serbia ban pork
products from
US. Indonesia
bans pork from
Mexico, US,
France, Canada,
Israel, Spain and
New Zealand.

May 3

Mexico
590(NA);
US 226(NA);
Canada
101(NA);

China is still holding Mexicans in
quarantine.

China stops
imports of
Alberta pork.

EU 91

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol22/iss1/1
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I

17

1

May 4

Mexico
822(NA); US
403(NA);
Canada
140(NA); EU
107

Argentina says it suspended flights
with Mexico because of its seasonal
influenza and dengue fever outbreaks.
China quarantines 25 Canadian
students, 2 US citizens, increases
delay for US visas to 6 days.

May 5

Mexico
942(NA); US
642(NA);
Canada
165(NA); EU
127

Mexico sends plane to get Mexicans
quarantined by China. China sends a
plane to get Chinese stranded to
Mexico. China has quarantined
Canadians and Mexicans based on
nationality.
Singapore orders a seven-day
quarantine for all passengers arriving

20 countries
have banned
imports of pork
and other meat
from countries
with reported
infections.
Russia extends
its pork import
ban to Canada
and Spain, but
lifts the ban for
some US states.

from Mexico, Canada and US.

Notes: The numbers of confirmed cases are based on WHO reports, backdated to take into
account the one-day delay in reporting North American figures in Geneva. The travel and trade
restrictions are based on media reports. Mexico began processing a backlog of suspected cases
on April 28, at which point Mexico's confirmed cases began to increase rapidly.

Sixth, the WTO was remarkably slow to address the
disproportionate trade restrictions, despite being the international
organization with jurisdiction over such matters. 66 The WTO Director
General's initial response, when prompted by a reporter's question, was
merely that no WTO members had formally notified the WTO of any
trade restrictions. 67 It took eight days from the start of the epidemic for
the WTO to issue a joint statement, together with the Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO), World Organization for Animal
Health (OIE) and WHO, that pork products handled in accordance with
hygienic practices are not a source of infection for the HIN1 (09)

66. Id.
67. Id.
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virus.6 8 The WTO is a member-driven organization, which may place
limits on the Director General's capacity to respond quickly to the use
of disproportionate or unjustifiable trade restrictions during disease
outbreaks in the absence of formal notifications or complaints. 69 This
suggests that WTO rules may need to be changed to allow the Director
General to take actions in the absence of formal notification, as the IHR
(2005) have done in allowing the WHO to gather information on disease
outbreaks from non-governmental sources.
Seventh, lack of access to accurate testing equipment severely
hampered Mexico's ability to quickly confirm the cause of death and
illness. 70 This led to the perception that Mexico's epidemic was far
worse than any other country's. 7 While Mexico initially reported
suspected cases on a daily basis, the United States limited its release of
information to confirmed cases, which reinforced the perception that
Mexico was much more seriously affected than the United States. 72 This
perception resulted in more severe trade and travel restrictions applied
to Mexico than to the United States or any other country (see Table 1),
as well as more severe domestic mitigation measures than elsewhere.
Once Mexico had the capacity to test samples, it limited its release of
information to confirmed cases, as the United States had done from the
beginning. These developments underline the importance of domestic
testing capacity and an effective communication strategy for both
domestic and international audiences. Figure 4 (below) compares
probable and confirmed cases in Mexico. Figure 4 shows that there is a
gap between the two. This arises directly from the lack of capacity and
equipments available in poor states of Mexico where such epidemics are
likely to arise. This stands in sharp contrast with the situation in the
United States where a preliminar confirmation is available within 24
hours of a reported probable case.

68.

Id.

69. BRADLY J. CONDON, EL DERECHO DE LA ORGANIZAClON MUNDIL
TRATADOs, JURISPRUDENCIA Y PRACTICA 74 (2007).

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

DE COMERCIO:

Condon & Sinha, supra note 1, app. A.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Figure 4: Probable and confirmed cases of Pandemic H1N1 (09)
virus in Mexico between 15 March 2009 and 26 April 2009
Probable and Confirmed Cases in Mexico
60
o Probable

50

E Confirmed

40
30

30-

JEnhanced Surveillance Begin

20
10

(Source: http://www.cdc.gov/m~mwr/)

If Mexico's willingness to promptly report outbreaks was based on
the notion that this would trigger WHO recommendations that would
help to reduce the risk of disproportionate trade and travel restrictions,
this incident may serve to undermine the IHR (2005) reporting
requirements. However, it is not at all clear that this was Mexico' s
motivation for prompt compliance. A more likely explanation is that
Mexico's political leadership recognized the need to respond quickly
with mitigation measures in order to minimize the health risks to its
own population. The inadequate government response to the 1985
Mexico City earthquake is considered to have been the beginning of the
end for the PRI, the party that enjoyed a monopoly on power for seven
decades, ending in 2000. s An inadequate response to the flu epidemic
could have produced similarly undesirable political consequences for
the Mexican President's party (PAN) or the Mexico City Mayor's party
(PRD). 76 Effective and timely mitigation measures would also be likely
to minimize the economic damage to Mexico's economy, regardless of
the WHO recommendations or other countries' responses to those
recommendationsk
75. Id.
76. Id
77. Id.
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Another factor that created incentives for Mexico to report and to
respond relatively quickly was the existence of confirmed cases in the
United States, since this could allow Mexico to benefit from American
bargaining power with other countries. However, this did not occur.
Several countries imposed trade restrictions and issued travel advisories
or restrictions that applied to Mexico without applying to the United
States. 78 It is not clear whether this was due to differences between the
two countries with respect to communication strategies (especially with
respect to releasing data on suspected cases), surveillance and testing
capacity (which would allow the United States to confirm or rule out
cases more rapidly), international bargaining power (for example,
pressuring the European Union (EU) health minister to retract her
statement regarding travel to the United States) 79 or some combination
thereof. Nevertheless, their different communication strategies do
appear to have had a major impact on media reporting, which in turn
influenced the perceptions and responses of other countries. It is unclear
what impact this might have on incentives to report only confirmed
cases, as opposed to both suspected and confirmed cases.

V. WHO GUIDELINES FOR COMMUNICATING

WITH THE PUBLIC

DURING AN OUTBREAK

The "WHO Guidelines for Communicating with the Public during
an Outbreak" (Guidelines) set out best practices for communicating
with the public during an outbreak.s0 They focus on two questions: (1)
how can communication hasten containment of an outbreak and (2) how
can communication help mitigate the social and economic impact.
The Guidelines first identify the unique circumstances, common to
disease outbreaks, that create unique challenges for public
communications: (1) outbreaks are urgent emergencies in which
decisions and actions must be taken rapidly, often with support from an
informed public; (2) the course of outbreaks is unpredictable, creating
unanticipated setbacks and surprises; (3) outbreaks usually alarm the
general public, causing great anxiety and extreme behaviors that cause
social disruption and economic losses out of proportion to the true
severity of the risk (including wearing masks, avoiding travel, fear of
hospitals, stigmatization of patients and minority groups, riots, loss of
78. See supra Table 1.
79. Condon & Sinha, supra note 1, app. A.
80. World Health Organization (WHO), Guidelinesfor Communicating with the Public
During an Outbreak, available at, http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/WHOCDS
2005_32web.pdf [hereinafter WHO Guidelines], consulted Apr. 29, 2009.
81. Id.
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confidence in governments and significant drops in consumer
consumption); (4) outbreaks have a high political profile, which can
make them a high priority or impede control when information is
downplayed or concealed to minimize economic consequences; (5)
outbreaks generate media coverage that can help to inform the public or
fuel public anxiety out of proportion to the actual threat; and (6) human
behaviors usually contribute to the spread of the disease. 82 These factors
are influenced by the nature of the disease: airborne transmission, high
mortality, international spread and the absence of a vaccine or cure will
heighten anxiety, factors that the IHR (2005) take into account in
determining whether an outbreak constitutes a public health emergency
of international concern. Disincentives to report outbreaks include
economic impact, the absence of laboratory diagnostic capacity to
confirm an unusual disease and the difficulty of spotting an unusual
disease in countries where there is constant high morbidity and
mortality from other infectious diseases. 84 Most, if not all, of these
factors were at play in the H IN 1 (09) epidemic.
Against this backdrop, the Guidelines identify five essential
practices for effective outbreak communication, based on the
experiences of several countries to disease outbreaks: (1) build trust, (2)
early announcement, (3) transparency, (4) respect for public concerns,
and (5) advance planning.85 Trust comes from public perceptions
(including those of the media) of the motives, honesty and competence
of authorities and needs to be developed before a disease outbreak.
Scientific uncertainty compounds distrust of government and suspicions
regarding its motives during an outbreak response, undermining
compliance with recommended control measures and allowing counterproductive behaviors to flourish.8 7 Distrust is created or increased by
concealment,
denial, understatement
and
bold reassurance
unsubstantiated by the scientific evidence, both domestically and
internationally.8 8 Conversely, when government officials report on the
outbreak frankly, openly, completely and constantly and engage outside
experts, trust increases and control measures are more effective. 89
People who are alert to symptoms are more likely to seek early
treatment and awareness of protective behaviors can help to prevent

82. Id. at 7-9.
83. Id. at 10. IHR (2005), Annex 2.
84. WHO Guidelines, supra note 80, at 10-11.
85. Id. at 3.
86. Id. at 23.
87. Id. at 23.
88. Id. at 24.
89. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010

21

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 1

22

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 22

further cases.90 The first communication about an outbreak will
influence public perceptions of subsequent communications; delayin
announcements and concealing information can breed lasting distrust.
While not all information must be revealed in real time, for example to
protect patient confidentiality, limits on transparency must be carefully
considered. 92 Planning communication strategies in advance, while not
essential to effective communication during an outbreak, helps to avoid

mistakes. 93
With the exception of the lack of coordination among different
levels of government, Mexico's communication strategy during the
2009 flu epidemic was largely consistent with WHO communication
guidelines. Mexico was right to reveal suspected cases so promptly and
frankly, even though this compared unfavorably with the U.S. strategy
of focusing only on confirmed cases. Given the technical limitations
Mexico faced in seeking to confirm cases quickly, a focus on confirmed
cases could only have given the impression that Mexico was delaying
and concealing information. Thus, given the circumstances, Mexico's
international communication strategy was likely the right one.
Mexico's domestic communication strategy, while relatively well
executed, appeared unable to overcome pre-existing mistrust of
government in Mexico. 94 On April 30, a survey of 410 Mexico City
adults revealed that 57% believed the government was underreporting
the numbers, 10% believed the numbers exaggerated, 19% believed
official figures and 14% were not sure what to think.95 Only 49% were
somewhat or very afraid of catching the flu, 50% felt little or no fear
and 1% did not know. 96 Half believed facemasks somewhat or very
effective in preventing infection and half believed they were mostly or
completely ineffective.97 From April 26 to May 8, we collected data on
daily mask usage on the Mexico City subway system, sampling 400
passengers per day for a total of 13 days. 9 8 The percentage of subway
passengers wearing face masks peaked on April 27 at around 60%.
After that, it went down steadil to virtually zero when the alert level
was reduced to Level 2 (yellow). 9
90. Id. at 12-18.
91. Id. at 24.
92. Id. at 24.
93. Id. at 25.
94. Bradly J. Condon & Tapen Sinha, Who is that Masked Person: The Use of Face
Masks on Mexico City Public TransportationDuring the Influenza A (HINI) Outbreak, at 6,
available at SSRN: http://ssm.com/abstract-1429824.
95. Id. at 3.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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VI. TRADE

RESTRICTIONS, THE IHR (2005) AND

23

WTO LAW

The IHR (2005)100 reflect the intention of its drafters to avoid
conflicts with other international legal obligations, particularly WTO
law. In particular, the drafters of the IHR (2005) have attempted to
facilitate the compatibility between temporary or standing
recommendations under the IHR (2005) and trade-related obligations by
establishing criteria that are similar to those used in WTO law,
especially the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.' 0 1
In Article 57.1 of the IHR (2005), "States Parties recognize that the
IHR and other relevant international agreements should be interpreted
so as to be compatible."l 02 This qrovision reflects the presumption
against conflict in international law. 03 Since the language of Article 17
reflects WTO law, it is unlikely that a conflict would arise between the
two. However, Article 57.1 goes on to state that "[t]he provisions of the
IHR shall not affect the rights and obligations of any State Party
deriving from other international agreements."'
It seems highly
unlikely that this provision would prevent a WTO panel from
considering the scientific evidence that supports any recommendations
issued by the WHO Director General, as a question of fact. A more
reasonable interpretation is that a WTO panel would be free to disregard
any legal determinations regarding whether a particular trade measure is
"more restrictive of international ... trade . .. than reasonably available
alternatives that would achieve the appropriate level of health
protection,"o as a question of law. This interpretation is consistent
with WTO and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)'0 6
jurisprudence that has taken scientific evidence from the WHO into
account in its analysis of trade-restrictive health measures under GATT
Article XX(b).10 7 It is also consistent with WTO jurisprudence that has
found that WTO panels are not obligated to apply the rulings of nonWTO tribunals.'o
100. IHR, supra note 3.
101. International Health Regulations Revision, Communication from the World
Health Organization,WTO Doc. G/SPS/GEN/522, 21, Oct. 2004, 6.
102. IIR, supra note 3, art. 57.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. arts. 17, 43.
106. GeneralAgreement on Tarifs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-ll, 55 U.N.T.S.
194 [hereinafter GATT], availableat http://www.worldtradelaw.net/uragreements/gatt.pdf.
107. Panel Report, Thailand - Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on
Cigarettes,DS1O/R - 37S/200 (Oct. 5, 1990); Appellate Body Report, European Communities Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R (Feb. 16,
2001).
108. Panel Report, Argentina - Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on Poultryfrom Brazil,

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010

23

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 1

24

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 22

GATT Article XX(b) permits trade restrictive measures that are
"necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health."l 09 The
WTO Member that enacted the measure has the burden of proof to show
that it meets the requirements of Article XX(b)."o First, the Member
must make a primafacie case that the policy goal at issue falls within
the range of policies designed to protect human, animal or plant life or
health."' Once it is established that the policy goal fits the exception,
the Member must demonstrate that the measure is "necessary" to
achieve the policy goal."12
To demonstrate that the measure is necessary involves weighing and
balancing a series of factors. First, the greater the importance of the
interests or values that the challenged measure is intended to protect, the
more likely it is that the measure is necessary. WTO jurisprudence has
found that "few interests are more 'vital' and 'important' than
protecting human beings from health risks."'" 3 Second, the greater the
extent to which the measure contributes to the end pursued, the more
likely that the measure is necessary. While WTO law recognizes that "it
may prove difficult to isolate the contribution to public health . .. of one

specific measure from those attributable to the other measures that are
part of the same comprehensive policy," the measure in question must
be "apt to produce a material contribution to the achievement of its
objective."' 4 Third, the less the trade impact of the challenged measure,
the more likely that the measure is necessary. Thus, a complete ban on
imports is less likely to qualify as necessary than less trade-restrictive
measures, such as quarantine or inspection requirements.
The fourth issue is whether a WTO-consistent alternative measure
the Member concerned could reasonably be expected to employ is
available, or whether a less WTO-inconsistent measure is reasonably
available. The weighing and balancing process of the first three factors
also informs the determination of the fourth. The party that enacted the
measure may point out why alternative measures would not achieve the
same objectives as the challenged measure, but it is under no obligation
to do so in order to establish, in the first instance, that its measure is
"necessary." However, if the party challenging the measure raises a
WT/DS241/R (Apr. 22, 2003).
109. GATT, supra note 106, art. XX.
110. Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, supra note 107,
at 57.
Ill. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id; Panel Report, Brazil - Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres,
WT/DS332/R (June 12, 2007).
114. Appellate Body Report, Brazil - Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres,
WT/DS207/AB/RW (Dec. 3, 2007).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol22/iss1/1

24

Condon and Sinha: The Effectiveness of Pandemic Preparations: Legal Lessons From th

2010] THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PANDEMIC PREPARATIONS: LEGAL LESSONS FROM THE 2009 INFLUENZA

25

WTO-consistent alternative measure that should have been taken, the
party defending the measure will be required to demonstrate why its
challenged measure nevertheless remains "necessary" in the light of that
alternative or why the proposed alternative is not, in fact, "reasonably
available," in the light of the interests or values being pursued and the
party's desired level of protection." 5
In the context of GATT Article XX(b), WTO jurisprudence has
confirmed that WTO Members have the right to determine the level of
protection of health that they consider appropriate in a given situation
and that they are not obliged to use an alternative measure that fails to
achieve their desired level of health protection." 6 Article 3.3 of the
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement)
confirms the right of a WTO Member to establish its own level of
sanitary protection.' 17 Similarly, the IHR (2005) provide that States be
entitled to implement health measures in response to specific public
health risks or public health emergencies of international concern,
which achieve the same or greater level of health protection than WHO
recommendations (Article 43.1(a)). When those health measures affect
international trade, they will have to comply with WTO law. However,
the right of a WTO Member to establish its own level of health or
sanitary protection may not make this a difficult hurdle. In the case of
import bans on pork in response to the HINI (09) outbreak, countries
might argue that their measures aim to eliminate entirely any health
risk. Since the WHO indicated that there was no risk as long as pork
was properly cooked, countries might argue that the risk of improperly
cooked pork required an import ban in order to eliminate any health
risk."t8
While the right of a WTO Member to determine an appropriate level
of health protection is absolute, the measure it chooses to implement its
policy, the manner in which it determines the appropriate level of
protection and the manner in which it chooses to apply the measure can
be challenged and set aside at the WTO.119 In order to justify a health
115. Appellate Body Report, US - Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and BettingServices, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005).
116. Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-ContainingProducts, WT/DS135/AB/R (Feb. 16, 2001).
117. JOHN H. JACKSON, 2002 DocuMENT SUPPLEMENT TO LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
INTERNATIONAL EcoNoMIC RELATIONS 123 (4th ed. 2002).

118. Condon & Sinha, supra note 1, app. A.
119. Gabrielle Marceau & Joel P. Trachtman, The Technical Barriersto Trade Agreement,
the SanitaryandPhytosanitaryMeasuresAgreement, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 811 (2002).
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measure under GATT Article XX(b), WTO Members may rely, "in
good faith, on scientific sources which, at that time, may represent a
divergent, but qualified and respected, opinion."l 20 While the scientific
basis need not represent the majority view within the scientific
community, it must have "the necessary scientific and methodological
rigor to be considered reputable science" and be "a respected and
qualified source."l 2 1 Under SPS Agreement Article 3.2, there is a
rebuttable presumption that SPS measures that conform to international
standards, guidelines or recommendations are consistent with the SPS
Agreement and GATT. In the SPS Agreement, the standard setting
bodies are clearly identified.122 Deviation from the relevant international
standards, guidelines or recommendations must be supported by
scientific justification (Article 3.3)123 and take into account risk
assessment techniques developed by the relevant international
organizations (Article 5.1).124 In the SPS Agreement, the requirement of
a risk assessment (Article 5.1) and "sufficient scientific evidence"
(Article 2.2) prevent the use of health measures for arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between Members or as a disguised
120. Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R (Feb. 16, 2001); Appellate Body Report,
European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),
WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998).
121. Appellate Body Report, Canada- ContinuedSuspension of Obligations in the EC Hormones Dispute. WT/DS321/AB/R (Oct. 16, 2008).
122. Annex A of the SPS Agreement provides the following definition of "international
standards, guidelines and recommendations":
(a) for food safety, the standards, guidelines and recommendations
established by the Codex Alimentarius Commission relating to food
additives, veterinary drug and pesticide residues, contaminants, methods of
analysis and sampling, and codes and guidelines of hygienic practice;
(b) for animal health and zoonoses, the standards, guidelines and
recommendations developed under the auspices of the International Office
of Epizootics;
(c) for plant health, the international standards, guidelines and
recommendations developed under the auspices of the Secretariat of the
International Plant Protection Convention in cooperation with regional
organizations operating within the framework of the International Plant
Protection Convention; and
(d) for matters not covered by the above organizations, appropriate
standards, guidelines and recommendations promulgated by other relevant
international organizations open for membership to all Members, as
identified by the Committee.
The WHO would qualify under paragraph (d) if so identified by the Committee. Jackson, supra
note 117, at 129.
123. Id. at 123.
124. Id. at 123-24.
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restriction on international trade.125 An SPS measure must be
sufficiently supported or warranted by a risk assessment, which may be
conducted by the WTO Member in question, another WTO Member or
an international organization.126 The chosen level of protection must not
affect the rigor or objective nature of the risk assessment, which must
evaluate possible adverse effects using scientific methods.' 27 Finally,
under both GATT Article XX(b) and SPS Agreement Article 2.3, health
measures must not be applied in a manner that results in discrimination
or a disguised restriction on international trade.' 28 While it is not clear
whether the countries that imposed trade restrictions did so following a
risk assessment that would meet the requirements of the SPS
Agreement, the discrimination between pork imports from Mexico and
other countries affected by HIN1(09) might be justifiable on the basis
that the mortality and severity of the epidemic in Mexico is greater and
the evidence indicated that the virus originated in Mexico.
Continued discrimination between Mexican products and products
from other countries could fail the test of the Article XX chapeau once
it became apparent that the risk in other countries was comparable to the
situation in Mexico. In other words, as long as the same conditions
prevail in the different countries with respect to the level of risk, the
discrimination would be arbitrary and unjustifiable.
In most cases, health measures will be regulated by both the GATT
and the SPS Agreement. The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
(TBT Agreement) does not apply to SPS measures. 129 However,
extraterritorial health measures, which are aimed at protecting health
outside the jurisdiction of the country that enacts the measure, could fall
under the ambit of the TBT Agreement.130 The Preamble of the TBT
Agreement also allows each WTO Member to determine the level of
protection it considers appropriate.' 3 Article 2.2 only requires a
consideration of "available scientific and technical information." 32
Since the TBT Agreement does not explicitly regulate risk assessment
or require scientific bases for regulations, the implicit requirement for
some scientific basis should be less rigorous than the explicit
requirements of the SPS Agreement.133 However, TBT Agreement
Article 2.5 creates a rebuttable presumption of compliance with Article
125. Id. at 122.
126. Appellate Body Report, European Communities Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998).
127. Id.
128. Jackson, supra note 117, at 122.
129. Id. at 150.
130. Marceau &Trachtman, supra note 119.
131. Jackson, supra note 117, at 149.
132. Id. at 150.
133. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010

Measures Concerning Meat and

27

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 1

28

FLORIDA JOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 22

2.2 where a technical regulation aimed at health protection is in
accordance with relevant international standards.1 34 Moreover, under
Article 2.2, the analysis of whether a technical regulation is more traderestrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective will be very
similar to the analysis under GATT Article XX(b).1
It may be difficult for WTO Members to justify trade restrictions on
products where there is insufficient scientific evidence that the product
poses a risk to human health 36 or when the trade measures will not
address the risk.13 7 However, the IHR 2005 (like the IHR 1969) does
not seriously deter countries from implementing trade restrictions that
do not have a solid scientific basis. While the WTO provides the real
disciplines in this context, the WTO process does not work quickly
enough because countries can enact harsh temporary measures, keep
them in place while the crisis lasts, and remove them before any serious
WTO dispute settlement remedy can be secured.
Once an outbreak of an infectious disease has been reported, the
affected country might have an incentive to comply with WHO
recommendations regarding appropriate responses, in order to minimize
the risk of disproportionate responses on the part of other countries. The
WHO's assessment of the public health risk and the appropriate
measures to take will carry more weight than the affected country's
assessment of the situation. Failure to comply with WHO
recommendations, or under compliance, could have a negative impact
not only on the protection of its citizens but also on the affected
country's effort to persuade other countries to avoid imposing trade and
travel restrictions. Given the economic and political incentives, there is
probably no need to make compliance with WHO recommendations
mandatory as far as they apply to the affected country. The key
obligation is to report the outbreak, at which point the risk of negative
economic consequences becomes real.
It would be redundant for the IHR (2005) to provide enforceable
legal obligations to regulate the use of disproportionate trade restrictions
in response to a reported outbreak, since those obligations are addressed
in WTO law. The key role of the WHO in this regard is to provide an
objective risk assessment and to make recommendations regarding
appropriate responses based on scientific evidence, both of which are
provided for in the IR (2005). The WHO's determinations on these
issues may be relevant to determine whether trade-restrictive health
134. Id. at 123-24.
135. Id. at 45.
136. Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and
Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998).
137. GATT Panel Report, Thailand- Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes
on Cigarettes,DS1O/R-37S/200 (Nov. 7, 1990).
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measures can be justified under the general exceptions of GATT Article
XX (b) or permitted under the SPS Agreement or the TBT Agreement.
When countries impose unjustified trade restrictions it may take a
few years to resolve the matter through the dispute settlement system of
the WTO, by which point the economic damage has already occurred.
In the age of internet, email and mobile telephones, it has become
difficult for countries to suppress information about outbreaks of
disease. The use of disproportionate trade measures in response to
outbreaks of infectious diseases undermine international health
protection by discouraging reporting of such outbreaks and undermining
incentives to comply with WHO recommendations under the IHR
(2005). Global Health Law and World Trade Law can and should be
mutually supportive. However, the formal dispute settlement system of
the WTO is unlikely to be effective in addressing this issue. Rather,
disproportionate trade restrictions will have to be addressed in
negotiations in which countries are persuaded that it is in the best
interests of all countries to comply with the existing legal framework in
order to ensure that both the multilateral trade system and multilateral
cooperation on world health issues function adequately.
Transparency needs to be encouraged (and discriminatory and
excessive trade and travel restrictions discouraged) in the interests of
public health. For example, information regarding the behavior of
(HIN1) in the Southern Hemisphere winter is important to determining
whether a vaccine is necessary, according to the WHO. In an effort to
determine how this virus might behave in the next Northern Hemisphere
winter, the CDC negotiated with the Pan American Health Organization
and health ministries in Latin America and other Southern Hemisphere
countries to monitor the virus during their winter flu season. If countries
perceive that they will suffer from more severe trade and travel
restrictions the more transparent they are, this will discourage the
sharing of vital information.
VH1. CONCLUSION
Accelerating globalization has changed the context in which the
WHO works, and has hastened the spread of infectious diseases.
Moreover, the multiplicity of players involved in tackling global health
issues has increased the need for global leadership to convene and
coordinate activities related to international health. In the wake of the
SARS epidemic, the IHR (2005) provided for binding obligations
(reporting outbreaks) and non-binding recommendations from the
WHO. In addition, the WHO studied best practices regarding
communication strategies during an outbreak. Many countries used past
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experiences with pandemics to prepare pandemic plans, including
Mexico and the United States. All of these developments were put to the
test in the HINI (09) epidemic. As a result, the experience with that
epidemic is a source of valuable information on how to continue
improving national and global responses to public health threats of
international concern.
The lack of financial assistance to help many developing countries
build their required core surveillance and response capabilities under the
IHR (2005) is an important gap in pandemic preparedness. The A/HIN1
outbreak highlighted the difficulties that can arise in rapidly detecting
public health threats, even in a middle-income country like Mexico or a
wealthy country like the United States, both of which had engaged in
intense international cooperation and preparation for such an event. In
addition, this outbreak revealed an asymmetrical application of travel
and trade restrictions between Mexico and the United States.
In our view, Mexico was singled out for more numerous and more
severe treatment for all the wrong reasons. Mexico reported the
outbreaks and determined the seriousness of the threat as quickly as the
United States. Mexico applied mitigation measures more quickly and
more broadly than any other country. Mexico communicated its actions
and all of the latest developments honestly and transparently. Mexico's
exemplary treatment of this outbreak limited the spread of the virus both
within Mexico and internationally. The disproportionate response of
several countries to Mexico's response may well discourage other
countries from acting so quickly, effectively and transparently in future
disease outbreaks, to the detriment of all countries.
The lack of any effective recourse under either the IHR (2005) or
the WTO compounds the problem of disproportionate and asymmetrical
travel and trade restrictions and creates disincentives to report outbreaks
and deal with them in a transparent and decisive manner. This is of
particular concern in view of the importance of rapid and transparent
responses to disease outbreaks and suggests a need for increased
attention to the issue of such travel and trade restrictions on the part of
both the WHO and the WTO. Finding ways to avoid such inappropriate
responses should also form part of the pandemic preparation process at
the national level.
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